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Andrew McGarva*

Keeping up with the Joneses: A Model
Systemic Risk Reporting Regime for the
Canadian Hedge Fund Industry

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a regulatory model by which Canadian
securities regulators may monitor the systemic risk contributed to by the Canadian
hedge fund industry The bases for this model are recent regulatory reform initiatives
adopted in the U.S. and Europe. There, securities regulators have adopted Form
PF and AIFMD, respectively, to monitor the systemic risk contributed to by hedge
funds. However, the features of those regimes are not necessarily appropriate for
the Canadian industry. The appropriateness of the features of Form PFandAIFMD
for the Canadian hedge fund industry is evaluated on two criteria: the average
industry fund size, and the cost of regulatory compliance. This paper identifies
three features of Form PFandAIFMD that are appropriate for the Canadian hedge
fund industry: a minimum size exemption, uniform reporting depth, and extensive
data sharing.

L'objectif de Iauteurest de proposer un modele de r6glementation par lequel les
instances r~glementaires canadiennes en mati~re de valeurs mobili6res pourraient
surveiller le risque syst~mique auquel contribue Iindustrie canadienne des fonds
de couverture. Le modele propos6 s'inspire des recentes initiatives de r6forme
de la r~glementation aux Etats-Unis et en Europe. Dans ces pays, les instances
r6glementaires en mati~re de valeurs mobilires ont adopt6, respectivement, le
Formulaire PF et IAIFMD, pour surveiller le risque syst~mique auquel contribuent
les fonds de couverture. Cependant, les caract~ristiques de ces r6gimes ne sont
pasn~cessairement appropri~es pour Iindustriecanadienne. La pertinence des
61ements du Formulaire PFet de IAIFMD pour lindustrie canadienne des fonds de
couverture est 6valuee en fonction de deux crit6res : la taille moyenne des fonds
et le coOt du respect de la r~glementation. Lauteur releve trois caractdristiques du
Formulaire PF et de IAIFMD appropri6es pour Iindustrie canadienne des fonds
de couverture : une mesure dexemption relative j la taille minimum, Iuniformit6
pour ce qui est des rapports et le partage de renseignements.

JD, Schulich School of Law, 2015. This paper won the 2014 JSD Tory Writing Award for legal
writing. Thank you to Jeff Rhodenizer, Victoria Mainprize and an anonymous reviewer.
*
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Introduction
"In this day and age, one cannot take two steps on Wall Street without
hearing the 'H' word. [...] What single sector could have possibly swept
the financial world off its feet the way this one has?"
-Andreas

Christofi et al.'

The need for and proper extent of financial regulation is a contentious
topic. Indeed, financial regulation is typically frowned upon in our
economic society, one built on a foundation of capitalism. 2 Among the
most debated regulations are those that relate to financial markets and
securities. As they supervise and control financial markets and securities,
regulators must strike a delicate balance between protecting vulnerable
investors, promoting innovation, and facilitating market efficiency.
The global financial crisis of 2008 was a powerful catalyst for sweeping
regulatory change. Beset by catastrophic losses in the highly regulated
banking industry, regulators in many jurisdictions turned their attention
towards financial markets and securities. Indeed, prior to the crisis, some
securities were either lightly- or even un-regulated; regulators intended to
correct these perceived deficiencies, whether a cause of the crisis or not.
In response to the tidal wave of opinion calling for reform to financial
markets and securities, regulators worldwide paid particular attention to a
3
single class of financial product: hedge funds.
Hedge funds are a tantalizing target for regulators worldwide; the
funds, and those that manage them, are notoriously secretive and the
subject of sensational media coverage. The staggering fraud perpetrated
by the hedge funds run by Bernard Madoff, and the high-profile allegations
of insider trading at Steven Cohen's SAC Capital Advisors, LP are but
two well-known examples of why hedge fund regulation has considerable
political and economic resonance. 4 More stringent oversight of the hedge
fund industry, then, is touted as a means to improve the stability of the
overall financial system.5
Not surprisingly, the approaches to hedge fund regulation reform
are disparate amongst jurisdictions. Two recent reform examples are the

I. Andreas Christofi et al, "Overview and Regulation of Hedge Funds" (2013) 17:5 Corporate
Finance Rev 24 at 24.
2.
Ibid at 33.
3.
Robert Bianchi & Michael Drew, "Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk" (2010) 19:1
Griffith L Rev 6.
4.
Lucia Quaglia, "The 'Old' and 'New' Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the
European Union" (2011) 34:4 West European Politics 665 at 665-666.
5.

Bianchi & Drew, supra note 3.
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hedge fund regulations imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer ProtectionAct,6 and those imposed in Europe by the European
Commission. Both of these regulatory reform initiatives include measures
intended to monitor the systemic risk caused by the hedge fund industry.
However, unlike the industries in the U.S. and Europe, the Canadian hedge
fund industry has not been subject to significant regulatory reform.
By way of brief introduction, this paper surveys contemporary hedge
fund regulation reform vis-d-vis systemic risk in the U.S. and Europe,
and then suggests which features of those regimes may be appropriate
for the Canadian hedge fund industry. However, before embarking on
this examination of hedge fund industry regulation, it is first necessary to
briefly explain what hedge funds are (and what they are not) and why they
are consequential in terms of systemic risk.
1. The long and short of hedgefunds
Hedge funds are notoriously difficult to define.7 Indeed, a categorical
definition of hedge funds is noticeably absent from securities legislation
and regulations. For example, none of the thirteen provincial or territorial
securities statutes or accompanying regulations includes a definition.
This is so because, as some commentators suggest, hedge funds cannot
be defined-that is, hedge funds are not homogeneous entities.8 They do,
however, share some common characteristics.
The SEC recently described hedge funds by comparing them
with mutual funds. Although the description is purposefully vague, it
does provide a convenient starting place for understanding hedge fund
characteristics:
Hedge funds typically have more flexible investment strategies than, for
example, mutual funds. Many hedge funds seek to profit in all kinds
of markets by using leverage (in other words, borrowing to increase
investment exposure as well as risk), short-selling and other speculative
investment practices that are not often used by mutual funds. 9
This description highlights several characteristics of hedge funds, namely
that they involve sophisticated strategies that take long and short positions,
6.
Pub L 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) [Dodd-FrankAct].
7.
Goldstein v SEC, 451 F (3d) 873 at para 2 (DC Cir 2006).
8. Alternative Investment Management Association, AlMA's Roadmap to Hedge Funds: 2012
Edition (December 2012), by Alexander Ineichen, online: AlMA <www.aima.org/en/education>
[AIMA, Roadmap 2012].
9.
US, Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin: Hedge Funds (SEC Pub No
139(2/13)) (Washington, DC: SEC, 2012) at 1, online: SEC <www.investor.gov> [SEC, Hedge
Funds].
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and that they are typically leveraged (as will be discussed). 0 These
characteristics make hedge funds a volatile, high-risk form of investment.
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has also had
occasion to describe hedge funds. The CSA also described hedge funds
by comparing them with mutual funds. As above, the CSA attempt at
definition is purposefully broad:
[Il]nvestment pools that use alternative investment strategies not generally
available to traditional mutual funds such as taking both long and short
positions and using arbitrage, leverage, options, futures, bonds and other
financial instruments to capitalize on market conditions."
This definition adds to the SEC description by highlighting that hedge
funds tend to use arbitrage to exploit market inefficiencies. Intuitively, this
focus on exploiting market information by hedge fund managers may lead
to instances of insider trading.
Another recognized characteristic of hedge funds is their fee structure.
A common fee structure is the so-called "2 and 20 rule" whereby managers
charge 2 percent of assets under management (AUM) and 20 percent of
profit as a performance fee. 12 And while this structure is not atypical of
the broader fund management industry, depending on the performance
and reputation of a hedge fund, fees can skyrocket; in the case of Steven
Cohen's SAC Capital Advisors LP hedge funds, the structure was
reportedly as high as "3 and 50!"'"
The SEC and CSA descriptions highlight several common hedge fund
characteristics. In general terms, hedge funds are pooled investments
that involve alternative investment strategies using both long and short
positions, are typically leveraged, use arbitrage, and have moderately
aggressive fee structures. It may come as a surprise, then, that hedge funds
were not the subject of direct regulation until very recently; or rather, that
they were able to benefit from numerous regulatory exemptions in some
jurisdictions.

10. Christofi et al, supranote I at 25.
11. CSA Staff Notice 81-316-Hedge Funds, OSC, CSA Staff Notice, (2007) 30 OSCB 277 (12
January 2007), online: OSC <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category8/
csa_20070112_81-316_hedge-ftnds.pdf [CSA Staff Notice 81-316, Hedge Funds].
12. SEC, Hedge Funds, supra note 9 at 3.
13. PBS, "Frontline: To Catch a Trader" (7 January 2014), online: PBS <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/to-catch-a-trader> at 00h:08m:05s.
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2. The elephant in the room?
"Growth of the hedge fund sector has been so explosive that it is truly
unclear how large of an impact it has on the world's, let alone the U.S.'s.,
investment decision-making."
-Andreas Christofi et al.' 4
Regulators are keenly aware of the consequences of financial instability
caused by systemic risk. In a 2009 joint report to the G20 Finance
Ministers and Governors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), and Financial Stability Board (FSB),
all prudential regulators, described systemic risk as follows:
[Systemic risk] is the disruption to the flow of financial services that is
(i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and
(ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real
economy."
Similarly, Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy describe systemic risk
as "the risk that shocks affect the financial sector and trigger an endogenous
adverse feedback significantly amplifying these shocks, causing further
deterioration in the financial sector, and leading to significant output
losses."' 6 Systemic risk, then, can perpetuate and even amplify adverse
financial conditions across and between financial industries.
In the same report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors, the
IMF, BIS, and FSB also described a conceptual model for assessing the
degree of systemic risk associated with a particular financial industry or
institution. 7 And while other, more sophisticated models have been tabled
since, this model provides an accessible and sufficient explanation of the
nature of systemic risk for present purposes. In simple terms, the systemic
importance of an industry or institution is a function of its size (in terms
of number of participants or volume of transactions), substitutability, and
interconnectedness. 8 Inother words, industries that perform many services
that cannot be directly replaced by other market participants in the event

14. Christofi et al, supra note I at 25.
15. International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements & Financial Stability Board,
"Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors: Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of
Financial Institutions, Markets, and Instruments: Initial Considerations" (IMF, BIS & FSB, October
2009) at 5-6, online: BIS <www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf> [IMF, BIS & FSB].
16. Markus K Brunnermeier, Gary Gorton & Arvind Krishnamurthy, "Risk Topography" (2011) 26
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 149 at 169.
17. IMF, BIS & FSB, supra note 15 at 2-3.
18. Ibid.
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of failure, and that have many indirect linkages to other industries, are a
greater source of systemic risk.
Promoting stability by monitoring and reducing systemic risk features
prominently in the mandates of securities .regulators worldwide. Indeed,
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has
identified "reduc[ing] systemic risk" as one of three main objectives of
securities regulators. 9
Securities commissions in Canada are also committed to reducing
systemic risk. Consider that the mission statement of the CSA explicitly
states that a priority of the Canadian regulatory system must be to "reduce[]
risks to market integrity. ' 20 Former vice-chair of the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC), Mary Condon, addressed the importance of reducing
systemic risk domestically in a 9 July 2012 speech to the Toronto Securities
Leadership Seminar:
[P]romoting financial stability has become a fundamental objective of
securities regulators - it is critical for protecting the interests of investors
and the integrity of our markets .... [A]t the OSC, we are integrating
systemic risk planning into our strategic planning and ongoing policy
work. For example, supporting and promoting financial stability is a new
organizational goal for the OSC.2'

Clearly, addressing contributing factors and sources of systemic risk is a
priority for financial regulators in Canada and worldwide.
That the hedge fund industry, as a whole, contributes to systemic risk
is settled. As will be explained, the techniques and interconnectedness
of the industry make it capable of perpetuating and amplifying negative
22
movements across the entire financial system.
The techniques of the hedge fund industry are a mixed blessing. On
the one hand, hedge funds are of benefit to the overall financial system,
while on the other, they also create economic concerns. Gerber, Vance and
Pasteur explain the tension caused by hedge funds:
Regulators, economists, and industry professionals all tend to agree that
hedge funds can benefit the overall economy by mitigating significant

19. "Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators" (2011) International Organization
of Securities Commissions Discussion Paper No OR01/11 at 13, online: LOSCO <www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf>.
20. Canadian Securities Administrators, "CSA Business Plan 2013-2016" (9 July 2013) at 1, online:
CSA <https://www.securities-administrators.ca>.
21. Mary Condon, "Canada's Role in Expanded IOSCO Principles" (Speech delivered at the Toronto
Securities Leadership Seminar, 9 July 2012) at 3-4, 21-22, online: OSC <www.osc.gov.on.ca>.
22. Mine Aysen Doyran, "Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk and Lessons for the Sub-Prime Financial
Crisis" (2009) 14:1 Business Rev, Cambridge 26.
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price downturns... [and] these benefits are attributed to the relaxed
regulations requirements imposed on hedge funds. However, less
regulation also creates significant economic concerns.23
More specifically, the benefits alluded to above include greater market
efficiency, new market exposures hot available through long position
investing, more effective corporate governance, and enhanced market
liquidity.24 However, these benefits come at a price: systemic risk.
The hedge fund industry techniques that contribute to systemic risk
have been the subject of extensive commentary. Much of this commentary
focuses on hedge fund leverage, or gearing. 25 In simple terms, leverage
involves borrowing funds to extend investment; then, overall gains are
realized when the invested funds outperform the cost of the borrowed
funds. In a practical sense, leverage is achieved through repurchase
agreements, short positions and derivatives contracts, all of which are
popular hedge fund techniques. 26 The result of leverage is that gains and
losses are amplified; hence risk is amplified. The danger on the downside
is that "selling and risk-reducing behaviour can result in a vicious circle
'27
of selling begetting more selling, market panic and distressed sellers.
Doyran explains why hedge fund industry techniques that lead to excessive
leverage are a source of systemic risk:
Systemic risk from hedge funds can stem from two sources: 1) banks'
massive exposure to them as counter-parties, [and] 2) their potential
to act contagiously on unrelated classes of assets and other financial
institutions as they are forced28 to significantly de-leverage or unwind
their positions during a crisis.
The latter source, widespread financial instability caused by hedge
funds relieving leverage, is of particular concern to regulators because,
as mentioned above, it can quickly spiral into market panic. The former
source, institutional exposure to hedge funds, is a function of the
interconnectedness of the industry throughout the financial system.
It is important to acknowledge that the hedge fund industry is not
alone or particularly unusual in its use of leverage. Other types of funds
23. Jeffrey Gerber, Neil Vance & Nicole Pasteur, "Hedge Funds-Impediments to Misconduct:
An Alternative to the Proposed Hedge Fund Transparency Act" (2011) 7 J Strategic Innovation &
Sustainability II at 13 [citations omitted].
24. Majed R Muhtaseb, "Growing Role of Hedge Funds in the Economy" (2013) 19:1 J Derivatives
& Hedge Funds I at 2.
25. Doyran, supranote 22.
26. ALMA, Roadmap 2012, supranote 8 at 104.
27. Ibid.
28. Doyran, supranote 22 at 28.
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and financial market participants also rely on leverage. Hedge funds may
even be considered modest in their use of leverage compared with other
market intermediaries, such as investment banks.29 Ang, Gorovyy and van
Inwegen explain with reference to the leverage ratios of several financial
industries around the time of the global financial crisis:
As hedge fund leverage declines in 2007 and continues to fall over
the financial crisis in 2008 and early 2009, the leverage of financial
institutions continues to inexorably rise. The highest level of gross hedge
fund leverage is 2.6 at June 2007, well before the worst periods of the
financial crisis. In contrast, the leverage of investment banks is 10.4
at June 2007 and severely spikes upwards to reach a peak of 40.7 in
February 2009.30

That is to say, the use of leverage is not unique to the hedge fund industry,
and does not implicate it as a financial culprit.
The interconnectedness of the hedge fund industry also contributes
to systemic risk. The meteoric growth of the industry in the last decade is
largely due to the institutionalization of hedge funds.3 Every investment
bank and private equity firm has either started or acquired a fund, and "no
self-respecting pension fund or university endowment has holdings not
found in hedge fund investments. '' 32 The hedge fund industry is directly
and indirectly linked to many financial institutions and sectors. And while
the interconnectedness of hedge funds is not in and of itself a source
of systemic risk, it does magnify that which is already present. Doyran
explains:
The size of the hedge fund industry is relatively small when compared to
commercial banks, investment banks, mutual funds and pension funds.
Although hedge funds should not be singled out for "causing" systemic
risk, their impact can be greatly magnified by trading strategies and
excessive
leverage based on complex derivatives contracts and short33
selling.

The interconnectedness of the hedge fund industry, then, contributes to
systemic risk because its exposure throughout the financial system can
magnify that risk which already exists.

29. Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy & Gregory B van Inwegen, "Hedge Fund Leverage" (2011)
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 16801 at 25, online: NBER <www.nber.
org/papers/W 16801 .pdf>.
30. ]bid at 26.
31. ALMA, Roadmap 2012, supranote 8 at 126.
32. Christofi et al, supra note 1 at 25.
33. Doyran, supranote 22 at 28.

182

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Clearly, monitoring and reducing sources of systemic risk is a priority
for financial regulators. It is equally evident that the hedge fund industry,
by its use of leverage and its interconnectedness, contributes to systemic
risk. And yet, until as recently as 2010 regulators did not, or could not,
monitor the systemic risk contributed to by the industry. Instead, the hedge
fund industry typically operated outside of the rigorous regulations that
addressed other investment products.,
Armed with robust new legislative authority, regulators worldwide
are now prepared to address the elephant in the room. Indeed, the broad
regulatory freedom afforded to the hedge fund industry in some important
jurisdictions is being narrowed. Undoubtedly, the industry is entering a
period of increased regulatory oversight and transparency.34 Much of this
new hedge fund regulation is intended to enhance financial stability by
monitoring and reducing systemic risk contributed to by the hedge fund
industry.
3. Research purpose andpaperoverview
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a model by which Canadian securities
regulators may monitor the systemic risk caused by the domestic hedge
fund industry. The bases for this proposal are the recent regulatory reform
initiatives undertaken in the U.S. and Europe. There, regulators have taken
unprecedented steps to reduce systemic risk by implementing new hedge
fund reporting and monitoring regimes. These mandatory reporting and
monitoring regimes, labeled Form Private Fund (Form PF) in the U.S.
and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) in
Europe, are providing securities regulators with comprehensive insights
into fund risk profiles.35 This paper asks: to what extent might the hedge
fund reporting and monitoring regimes adopted in the U.S. and Europe
be appropriate and practicable for the Canadian hedge fund industry? Or,
more specifically, which features of Form PF and AIFMD are appropriate
in the Canadian regulatory context?
Rather obviously, the hedge fund reporting and monitoring initiatives
undertaken in the U.S. and Europe are not entirely appropriate for the
Canadian regulatory environment. For one thing, those industries are
considerably larger, in terms of capital invested (or AUM) and number
of funds, than the Canadian industry. A simple cut-and-paste approach
to regulatory reform in Canada is unsuitable. Therefore, a more selective

34. Mary Jo White, "Hedge Funds: A New Era of Transparency and Openness" (Speech delivered at
the Managed Funds Association Outlook 2013 Conference, New York, 18 October 2013), online: SEC
<www.sec.gov>.
35. Ibid.
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means of assessing the appropriate features of Form PF and AIFMD is
necessary.
Two criteria will be used to assess the appropriateness of the features
of Form PF and AIFMID: average industry fund size, or AUM (the terms
are hence used interchangeably), and the cost of compliance. As regards
the former criterion, Form PF in particular is progressive; that is, larger
funds report more information and more frequently than smaller funds.
Only those features that are intended for smaller funds are appropriate
in the Canadian context. As regards the latter criterion, recent industry
research suggests that the cost of compliance is not uniform amongst
industry participants; indeed, smaller participants are disproportionately
burdened by reporting.36 Only features sensitive to the cost of compliance
for smaller funds are appropriate in the Canadian context.
An important presumption driving this analysis is that a systemic
risk reporting and monitoring regime is desirable, or at least beneficial,
for the Canadian hedge fund industry. While it is clear that Canadian
securities regulators are focused on reducing systemic risk, it is less clear
that they are able to direct scarce resources towards the negligible risk
caused or contributed to by Canadian hedge funds. As will be discussed,
the Canadian industry is relatively small and fragmented, and the funds
therein are already subject to regulation; it is reasonable to surmise that
implementing a costly reporting regime is not a priority for Canadian
regulators. However, for the sake of analysis, and with due sensitivity to
the distinct Canadian context, an appropriate regime will be tabled.
The outline of this paper is a journey through global hedge fund
regulation. The journey begins in the U.S., moves to Europe, and finally
arrives in Canada. For each jurisdiction, the hedge fund industry and
regulatory framework is introduced. Then, the features of the reporting
regimes are identified. Finally, those features are assessed for their
appropriateness in the Canadian context.
I.

U.S. hedgefund industry and regulationreform
"We're gonna need a bigger boat."
-Roy Schnieder as Brody in Jaws

The U.S. hedge fund industry was unique in that it operated with maximum
flexibility.37 More so than in other jurisdictions, U.S. hedge funds were
36. KPMG, Alternative Investment Management Association & Managed Funds Association, "The
Cost of Compliance: 2013 KPMG/AIMA/MFA Global Hedge Fund Survey" (October 2013), online:
KPMG <www.kpmg.com> [KPMG, AIMA & MFA, "The Cost of Compliance"].
37. Bianchi & Drew, supra note 3 at 11.
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largely exempt from the disclosure and registration requirements intended
to capture other private funds. Or more precisely, they were organized
to benefit from numerous, deliberate exemptions in securities and
corporate legislation.3 8 This amenable, rules-based regulatory framework
attracted much interest from talented managers and investors alike. Not
surprisingly, the U.S. hedge fund industry has grown substantially in the
last two decades; recent estimates suggest that it accounts for 70 per cent
of global hedge fund investment!3 9
This section discusses the U.S. hedge fund industry and existing
regulatory framework, and hedge fund regulation reform in the U.S. and
the features of Form PF.
1. Give me liberty...: The U.S. hedge fund industry and regulation
primer
The U.S. hedge fund industry is mature, both in terms of composition
and regulation. That is to say, the industry is large, stratified, and highly
concentrated, and the existing regulatory framework was antiquated. This
section briefly describes the composition of the U.S. hedge fund industry
and outlines the existing regulatory framework.
The U.S. hedge fund industry has many large- and very large-sized
funds, and is highly concentrated. According to industry data from 2012,
"[a]round 61% of assets are concentrated in 3.7% of the hedge funds that
have more than $1 billion under management."4 The global financial crisis
did much to perpetuate this trend.4' With so much capital concentrated in
relatively few large funds, the need for systemic risk monitoring is made
more obvious.
In the U.S., hedge funds were typically structured and operated so as
to benefit from exemptions to existing securities and corporate legislation.
Of particular importance to this analysis are those exemptions pursuant to
the Securities Act 193342 and the Investment Company Act 1940,43 as they
allowed funds to avoid disclosing their holdings and risk exposure to the
SEC.

38.
US, Securities and Exchange Commission, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds
(Washington, DC: SEC, 2003), online: SEC <www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf> [SEC,
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds].
39. AIMA, Roadmap2012, supra note 8 at 20.
40. Ibid at 19.
41. Ibid.
42. Pub L 73-22, 48 Stat 74 (1933).
43. Pub L 76-728 (1940).
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The SecuritiesAct 1933 requires entities that issue securities to provide
full and fair disclosure.' This disclosure includes information about fees,
expenses, performance, and most importantly, holdings. 45 If provided, this
information could be utilized by investors and regulators alike to monitor
risk exposure. However, according to Bianchi and Drew, "[h]edge funds
circumvent this requirement via section 4(2) and regulation D of the Act,
exempting funds that offer securities by private placement, which are
securities that are not offered via public advertisement or appeal."46 Hedge
funds also avoid the regulation D requirement (specifically Rule 506 of
regulation D) by only offering investment to a limited number of high net
worth individuals, defined in the legislation as "accredited investors."47
The Investment Company Act 1940 imposes more onerous disclosure
and reporting requirements than the Securities Act 1933. The Investment
Company Act 1940 requires all companies that meet the statutory definition
of "investment company" to "register with the [SEC] and disclose their
investment positions and financial condition. 4' From a systemic risk
monitoring perspective, this information is invaluable. Here again, hedge
funds avoid divulging their holdings and risk exposure by structuring
themselves to avoid two key provisions (sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)).
To do so, funds limit their number of beneficial owners to less than one
hundred, and offer investment oily to "qualified purchasers" (viz. those
with greater than $5 million invested).49 Of note, the Dodd-FrankAct has
largely superseded the Investment Company Act 1940.
It is clear that the U.S. regulatory framework was flexible enough for
hedge funds to benefit from exclusions intended to oversee the financial
markets and securities. Similarly, the U.S. legal environment was silent on
the use of leverage and systemic risk management.5 0 All that would change
following the global financial crisis: enter the Dodd-FrankAct and Form
PF.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supranote 38 at 13.
Christofi et al,
supra note 1 at 30.
Bianchi & Drew, supra note 3 at 11.
SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supranote 38 at 15.
Christofi et al,
supra note 1 at 30.
SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supranote 38 at 11-12.
Bianchi & Drew, supranote 3 at 11.

186

2.

The Dalhousie Law Journal

... or give me death!: U.S. hedgefund regulationreform and Form

PF
"[P]erhaps more than ever before, the hedge fund industry as a whole
is experiencing dynamic change-moving from what some would say
was a secretive industry, to a widely-recognized and influential group of
investment managers."
-Mary Jo White, Chair SEC 5'
In response to the global financial crisis, the U.S. Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010. The Act, which represents the most
extensive legislative overhaul of financial regulations since the 1930s,
was intended to reduce systemic risk, increase transparency, and promote
market integrity. 2 As such, the Dodd-Frank Act affected all financial
institutions and industries in the U.S.
Some are critical of the Dodd-FrankAct, suggesting that its massive
scope is excessive and knee-jerk, even referring to it as "quack corporate
governance regulation. 5 3 Others point out that the Act does not adequately
4
focus on the toxic securities at the centre of the global financial crisis.
Such is typical of a so-called boom-bust-regulate pattern of regulation:
regulation is hastily adopted during and immediately following a financial
crisis, and is often driven by policy and political agenda rather than need. 5
Indeed, the Dodd-FrankAct extends to institutions and industries with
tangential or debatable links to the global financial c.risis. This is certainly
true of the hedge fund industry. There is considerable and ongoing debate
about the extent to which the U.S. hedge fund industry contributed to
the global financial crisis, if at all. However, this debate is outside the
scope of this paper. The simple fact is that the Dodd-FrankAct does affect
regulatory reform for the hedge fund industry, regardless of whether it
should.
This section briefly describes the extent of hedge fund regulatory
reform in the U.S. vis-d-vis systemic risk, and describes the function and
features of Form PF.
Pursuant to Title IV of the Dodd-FrankAct, the SEC undertook to
monitor the systemic risk caused or contributed to by the U.S. hedge fund
51. White, supra note 34.
52. James M Cain et al, "Regulatory Watch List for 2012: The Shifting Landscape for Hedge Funds
and other Private Funds" (2012) 13:2 J Investment Compliance 6 at 6.
53. Stephen M Bainbridge, "Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II" (2011)
95:5 Mim L Rev 1779 at 1783.
54. Roberta Romano, "Regulating in the Dark" (2012) Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No
442 at 9, online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1974148.
55. Bainbridge, supra note 53 at 1782, 1816.
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industry. In particular, the Act directed the SEC to collect basic, non-public
56
information from hedge funds and advisors regarding their risk profiles.
According to the SEC:
Section 404 [of the Dodd-Frank Act] directed the [SEC] to establish
reporting requirements for investment advisers to private funds as
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection
of investors or for assessment of systemic risk by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC).57
This broad mandate directed the SEC to collect information as never
before, and to share that information with the FSOC. In particular, the
Dodd-FrankAct specified that reporting must include information about:
"the amount of assets under management, use of leverage... and trading
practices for each private fund managed by the adviser."58
On 31 October 2011, the SEC adopted Form PF as the mode of
collecting systemic risk information from all private funds, including
hedge funds.59 According to Norm Champ, deputy director, SEC Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations, "[t]he information reported in
Form PF will be used by the [FSOC] to monitor risks to the U.S. financial
system and by the SEC to conduct risk assessments. ' 6° This approach
of reporting and monitoring represents a paradigm shift in hedge fund
regulation: "[u]sing this information, regulators can then assess trends
over time and identify risks as they are emerging, rather than reacting to
'6t
them after they unfold."
The features of Form PF are intended to provide the SEC and
FSOC with data about hedge funds that is practicable and adequately
comprehensive. Above all, Form PF is progressive; that is, the depth and
frequency of the filing depends on fund size.62 The four features of Form
PF that are identifiable from the SEC Annual Staff Report Relating to the
Use of Data Collected from Private Fund Systemic Risk Reports are (a)
a minimum size exemption, (b) progressive reporting frequencies, (c)

56. White, supranote 34.
57. US, Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Data
Collectedfrom PrivateFund Systemic Risk Reports (Washington, DC: SEC, 25 July 2013) at 2, online:
SEC <www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/im-annualreport-072513.pdf> [SEC, Annual Staff Report re
Use of Data].
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Norm Champ, "What SEC Registration Means for Hedge Fund Advisers" (Speech delivered to
the New York City Bar, II May 2012), online: SEC <www.sec.gov>.
61. White, supra note 34.
62. Jeff Rhodenizer, "Form PF: Measure Twice, Cut Once" (2013) HFM Week Special Report:
Cayman 2013, 35 at 35 [Rhodenizer, "Measure Twice, Cut Once"].
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progressive depth of reporting, and (d) extensive data sharing.63 Each will
be discussed separately.
a. Minimum size exemption
Funds with less than USD 150 million regulatory funds under management
(RAUM) are exempt from reporting. RAUM was selected to measure
fund size because it measures the gross assets of all securities in the fund
portfolio before subtracting any leverage or other liabilities.64 According
to Jeff Rhodenizer of Admiral Administration, "[t]he new method provides
more consistency in the reporting of funds than the traditional [net asset
value], where use of leverage may distort the potential impact of assets
on the [U.S.] financial system. ' '65 It is also worth noting that RAUM is

measured at the advisor level, which means that single (institutional)
advisors may not divide their managed AUM between multiple funds to
avoid reporting. This exclusive feature of Form PF was added based on
industry concerns about the disproportionately burdensome impact of
66
reporting on very small funds.
b. Progressive reportingfrequencies
The frequency of Form PF filing increases as fund RAUM increases;
not surprisingly, the SEC and FSOC demand more frequent filings from
larger, riskier hedge funds. Ostensibly, the progressivity of this feature is
intended to capture the enhanced risk and interconnectedness of large and
very large funds. Funds and advisors with between USD 150 million and
1.5 billion RAUM are required to file annually, and those with greater than
USD 1.5 billion RAUM must file quarterly.67 Besides filing less frequently,
small- and medium-sized funds also have more lenient filing deadlines.
Funds and advisors with less than USD 1.5 billion RAUM have 120 days
from the fiscal year end to file Form PF, whilethose with greater than USD
1.5 billion RAUM have just 60 days.68
c. Progressivedepth of reporting
Just as smaller funds are subject to less frequent reporting than larger ones,
so too are smaller funds required to report less data than larger funds.
Here again, the progressivity of this feature captures the enhanced risk
and interconnectedness of large and very large funds. Conveniently, the

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

SEC, Annual StaffReport re Use of Data, supra note 57.
Rhodenizer," Measure Twice, Cut Once," supra note 62 at 35.
Ibid.
SEC, Annual StaffReport re Use of Data, supra note 57 at 4-5.
Ibid at4.
Ibid at5.
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progressivity of the data-reporting regime is based on the same RAUM
threshold as the reporting frequency. Funds and advisors with between
USD 150 million and 1.5 billion RAUM are required to report the
following general data: types of funds advised or managed; fund metrics
such as size, leverage, liquidity, and performance; types of investors;
fund strategy; and use of trading and clearing mechanisms.69 This general
information allows regulators to assess the likelihood that investors will
withdraw their funds in a given period, and the impact of fund failure on
counterparties.7" In addition to these general data, funds with greater than
USD 1.5 billion RAUM must report more specific information, including:
geographical concentration, turnover by asset class, risk profile, and direct
and indirect forms of leverage and liquidity.7
d. Extensive data sharing
The industry data collected by the SEC in Form PF are significant to many
regulatory stakeholders. Besides the FSOC, the SEC shares the public and
proprietary data it collects with other commissions and offices. The SEC
lists several like-minded regulators that are making use of the Form PF
data:
In particular, the Division of Economic and RiskAnalysis has successfully
incorporated Form PF data into its proprietary analytic tool; the Division
of Investment Management's Risk and Examinations Office is working to
develop analytics using Form PF information that will allow it to monitor
the risk-taking activities of investment advisers to private funds; and the
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations anticipates using
the information collected on Form PF in conducting pre-examination
due diligence and in risk identification.72
The SEC also provides non-proprietary data to IOSCO "so IOSCO has a
more complete overview of the global hedge fund market for a report that
will be shared with the Financial Stability Board."73
Not surprisingly, implementing Form PF reporting at the fund level is
an immense challenge. Many funds and fund administrators are not tooled
to collect the data required by the new regulation. Since implementing
Form PF in 2012, advisors and administrators have been busy identifying

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Ibid at4.
Interview of Jeff Rhodenizer (26 March 2014).
SEC, Annual Staff Report re Use of Data,supra note 57 at 4.
Ibid at 1.
Ibid.
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data gaps and fielding data collection resources of their own.7 This is a
costly process.
II. European hedgefund industry and regulationreform
"Unity in diversity"
-European Union motto
Unlike the U.S. hedge fund industry, the European industry is multitudinous.
That is, the European hedge fund industry is the aggregate of many
national-level industries. Not surprisingly, regulation varied greatly
amongst jurisdictions, and attempts at macro-level regulation have been
a source of debate. Indeed, existing differences in national economies and
legislation made harmonization particularly difficult.75 However, since the
global financial crisis, powerful political and economic forces have largely
overcome those differences and forced convergence on common European
hedge fund rules.
This section discusses the European hedge fund industry, its existing
regulatory framework, hedge fund regulation reform in Europe, and the
features of AIFMD.
1. Achtung, hedgefonds!.: The European hedge fund industry and
regulationprimer
Prior to the global financial crisis, the European hedge fund industry
was dominated by two opposing regulatory doctrines: one in favour of
uniform regulation and one opposed to it.76 As regards the former doctrine,
Germany and France advocated "a tougher regulatory regime for hedge
funds and wanted the funds to be overseen similarly to banks." 7 This more
stringent approach was based on a deep mistrust of hedge fund practices
and activities. Quaglia explains:
Policy-makers in France, Germany and Italy were keen to regulate
hedge funds in the EU because they worried about activist investors,
such as hedge funds and private equities, threatening to overturn
'cosy corporatism' in their domestic economies, disrupting established
corporate governance arrangements."
By contrast, securities regulators in the U.K. advanced a "soft-hand"
approach. Their regime favoured disclosure and transparency over direct
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Rhodenizer, "Measure Twice, Cut Once," supra note 62 at 36.
Quaglia, supra note 4 at 666.
Ibid at 670.
Ibid.
Ibid at 674 [citation omitted].
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regulation. There, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), now the
Financial Conduit Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority,
committed to curtail additional regulation unless market failure required
otherwise.7 9 The opening statement of a 2006 FSA discussion paper,
entitled Hedge Funds:A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement,
provides a rationale for the relatively light regulation:
We recognise the growing importance of hedge funds and their
contribution to financial markets. The number of managers is growing
and London is a major centre of hedge fund manager activity (second
only to New York for location of managers). We are committed to playing
our part to ensure the U.K. remains an attractive location for hedge fund
managers to be based."0
Not unlike the U.S. industry at the same time, the favourable regulatory
environment in the U.K. had attracted talented managers and much
investment; the industry was booming. However, following the global
financial crisis, this doctrine of "soft-hand" regulation was conceded,
paving the way for a more comprehensive regulatory architecture." Enter
AIFMD.
2.

European hedgefimd regulation reform and AIFMD
"The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), the
most significant piece of regulation to be introduced to the alternatives
industry, has been met by the European financial community with a
degree of confusion and concern."
-Mario

Mantrisi, KNEIP 2

With the backing of Germany and France, the European Commission set
out in 2009 to reform the alternative investment industry in Europe. This
was seen as an important part of the Commission's overall response to the
global financial crisis. Indeed, alternative investments, including hedge
funds, were singled out for more stringent regulation because, according
to the Commission, "recent events have demonstrated that the activities
of [alternative investments] are not sufficiently transparent and that the
associated risks are not sufficiently addressed by current regulatory and
79. George Sami, "A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States and
Europe" (2009) 29:1 Nw J Intl L & Bus 275 at 300.
80. UK, Financial Services Authority, Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory
Engagement: Feedback on DP05/4(Feedback Statement 06/2) (London, UK: FSA, 2006) at 3, online:
FSA <www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf>.
81. Quaglia, supranote 4 at 671.
82. Mario Mantrisi, "How Should Managers Approach AIFMD?" (2013) 96 AlMA J 57 at 57,
online: AlMA <www.aima.org/en/education/aimajournal/>.
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supervisory arrangements." 3 The stated purpose of the AIFMD proposal
was fourfold: to harmonize regulatory standards on an ongoing basis, to
enhance transparency towards investors and public authorities, to enable
member states to improve macro-prudential oversight, and to overcome
4
gaps and inconsistencies in the existing regulatory framework.1
On 11 November 2010 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly
to adopt AIFMD11 Speaking on the occasion, Jos6 Manuel Barroso, former
President of the European Commission, commented:
The adoption of the directive means that hedge funds and private
equity will no longer operate in a regulatory void outside the scope of
supervisors. The new regime brings transparency and security to the way
these funds are managed and operate, which adds to the overall stability
of our financial system. 6
Alternative investments, including hedge funds, were hence subject to
transnational European regulation that included "reporting requirements
of systemically important data to supervisors."87 Pursuant to Article 47 of
Directive 201 1/61/EU, implementation and collection of AIFMD data was
delegated to the European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA) and
the European Systemic Risk Board.8 8
According to the ESMA, the features of AIFMD are intended to
provide more comprehensive and consistent data on hedge fund and
private equity fund activities.89 Foremost, AIFMD stresses uniformity as
the appropriate approach to data collection; the principles guiding ESMA
in collecting data are that there be "common, uniform and consistent
application of the reporting obligations." 90 In that sense, AIFMD is
inherently less progressive than Form PF. The three features of AIFMD
83.
EC, Press Release, IP09/669, "Financial Services: Commission proposes EU framework for
managers of alternative investment funds" (29 April 2009), online: EC <europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease IP-09-669_en.htm> [EC, "Commission proposes EU framework"].
84. Ibid.
85.
EC, Press Release, MEMO/10/573, "European Commission statement at the occasion of the
European Parliament vote on the directive on hedge funds and private equity" (11 November 2010),
online: EC <europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO- 10-5 73_en.htm>.
86. Ibid.
87. Quaglia, supra note 4 at 673.
88. . EC, Commission Directive 2011/61/EUofJune8 2011 on AlternativeInvestment FundManagers
and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU)
No 1095/2010, [2011] OJ, L 174/1 at 58.
89. EC, European Securities and Markets Authority, Press Release, ESMA/2013/1368, "ESMA
clarifies reporting requirements for alternative fund managers" (1 October 2013), online: ESMA
<www.esma.europa.eu> [ESMA, "ESMA clarifies reporting requirements"].
90. EC, European Securities and Markets Authority, Final Report: Guidelines on Reporting
Obligations underArticles 3(3)(d) and 24(l), (2) and (4) oftheAIFMD (Paris: ESMA, 2013) [ESMA,
Guidelines on Reporting Obligations].
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that are identifiable from the ESMA guidelines on data reporting, entitled
FinalReport: Guidelines on Reporting Obligationsunder Articles 3(3)(d)
and 24(1), (2) and (4) of the AIFMD, are: (a) a minimum size exemption,
(b) progressive reporting frequency, and (c) uniform depth of reporting.9 1
Each will be discussed separately.
a. Minimum size exemption
Funds with less than E100 million AUM are exempt from reporting.
Additionally, AIFMD discriminates in favour of funds that do not use
leverage: "[a] higher threshold of 500 million applies to AIFM not using
leverage (and having a five years lock-in period for their investors) as
they are not regarded as posing systemic risks. 9 2 To put this exemption in
perspective, the ESMA estimates that it will only apply to funds with ten
per cent of total industry AUMI.

93

b. Progressivereportingfrequency
The reporting frequency of AIFMD data depends on the size and activities
of the fund. Depending on the fund AUM and whether it uses leverage
as strategy, reporting may be annually, semi-annually, or quarterly. 94 For
funds that exceed the minimum size threshold and are unlevered, reports
must be filed annually. For funds that are levered, those with less than
El billion must file semi-annually and those with greater than El billion
must file quarterly. As with Form PF, this feature is intended to capture the
enhanced risk and interconnectedness of large and very large funds.
c. Uniform depth of reporting
The quantity and quality of data that all fund managers must report under
AIFMD are substantial. In total, managers must report 130 data points for
each fund they manage; "[t]his could mean that larger [managers] will be
required to capture thousands of points of data from multiple funds and
from many different sources." 9 According to the ESMA, there are two
broad categories of required AIFMD data: portfolio concentration and risk
profile.96 Portfolio concentration data include breakdown of investment
strategies, principal markets, fund AUM, and principal exposures. Risk
profile data include fund risk measures, liquidity profile, and fund leverage

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Ibid.
EC, "Commission proposes EU framework," supra note 83.
Ibid.
ESMA, Guidelines on Reporting Obligations,supra note 90 at 46.
Mantrisi, supra note 82 at 57.
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(where applicable). Together, these two categories of AIFMD data
constitute a substantial burden on European-domiciled hedge funds.
As with Form PF, AIFMD reporting has created a host of costly
organizational requirements. However, funds themselves may stand to
benefit from the new reporting regime:
The road to AIFMD compliance must start with organizations taking
stock of their entire fund strategy ....
Those that take this opportunity to
"clean house" will not only reduce their compliance burden, they will
also streamline their operations and fine-tune their strategies. 97
III. Canadianhedgefund industry and regulation
"Canada has often been described as the emerging market play without the
emerging market risk-we find ourselves, fortunately, at the intersection
of global interests with a strong commodities sector and robust financial
architecture on offer."
-- Claude Robillard, CIBC Prime Services Group98
As the leading quotation suggests, Canada has a desirable, albeit
relatively small, hedge fund industry. A stable financial sector, effective
regulation, and increased institutional-investor confidence are but a few
factors that have contributed to growth in the industry. According to Gary
Ostoich, President of the Canadian chapter of the Alternative Investment
Management Association, "[t]his has resulted in a dramatic shift and
growth in the AUM of tle industry, which is estimated to have grown from
$12 billion five years ago to over $30 billion today." 99 This remarkable
growth occurred despite a record number of Canadian-domiciled hedge
funds closing in the last twelve months.' The Canadian hedge fund
industry is, after all, not immune to the powerful forces that offset growth
in other sectors and jurisdictions.
This section briefly describes the Canadian hedge fund industry and
the existing regulatory framework.

97. KPMG, AIMA & MFA, "The Cost of Compliance," supra note 36 at 19.
98. Claude Robillard, "The Rise of Alternative Investments in Canada: The Case for Emerging
Managers" in Alternative Investment Management Association, AIMA Canada Handbook (Toronto:
AMA Canada, 2012) 54, online: AIMA Canada <canada.aima.org/en/canada/education/aima-canadahandbook.cfm> [AIMA Canada, Handbook].
99. Gary Ostoich, "Overview of Canada's Hedge Fund Industry" in AIMA Canada, Handbook,
supra note 98, 6 at 7.
100. Ibid.
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1. The Canadian hedgefund industry and regulationprimer
"From a regulatory perspective, Canada has had a comprehensive
framework for money managers, including hedge funds, for decades."
-Gary

Ostoich, President AIMA Canada'

In true Canadian fashion, the domestic hedge fund industry is sensible
and modest. This is not to say that the Canadian industry is insignificant.
Rather, it is simply less mature and far less extravagant than its much
larger cousin to the south.
The Canadian industry is relatively small, both in terms of total
investment and average fund size. First, consider that the CAD 30 billion
or so invested in the Canadian hedge fund industry amounts to a little
more than one per cent of the USD 2.63 trillion invested in hedge funds
globally. 1 2 Second, consider that the Canadian space is populated by
roughly 250 individual funds, most of which have between $50 million and
$100 million AUM.10 3 Indeed, only 15 per cent of Canadian funds manage
more than CAD 100 million. 0 4 Compare those figures with the U.S.
hedge fund industry, where there are more than four thousand funds with
greater than USD 1.5 billion RAUM!"' s Based on the foregoing figures,
the majority of Canadian hedge funds would not meet the minimum size
exemptions for Form PF or AIFMD.
However, some see the small size of the Canadian industry not as
a deterrent, but as an opportunity. For many domestic and international
investors, the Canadian hedge fund industry is an attractive alternative to
the saturated U.S. industry, where massive size has tended to limit arbitrage
opportunities.10 6 In some respects, the small size of many Canadian funds
allows them to be more innovative. Katrina Rempel of BMO Capital
Markets Prime Brokerage Services explains: "[t]he smaller size of many
Canadian funds enables the managers to be nimble and quickly capitalize
on opportunities in the market that might elude larger funds."' 7 The
Canadian hedge fund industry may be small, but it is mighty.

101. Ibid.
102. Hedge Fund Research Inc, Press Release, "Hedge Fund Assets Surge to New Record to Begin
2014" (21 January 2014), online: HFR <https://www.hedgefundresearch.com>.
103. Robillard, supranote 98 at 54.
104. Ibid.
105. SEC, Annual Staff Report re Use of Data,supra note 57 at 5.
106. Robillard, supranote 98 at 55.
107. Katrina Rempel, "The Canadian Asset Raising Landscape" in AlMA Canada, Handbook, supra
note 98, 62 at 62.
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With the foregoing in mind, it is important to acknowledge that the
Canadian hedge fund industry does not contribute appreciably to systemic
risk. Indeed, it is not clear whether the Canadian industry contributes to
systemic risk at all. Based on our understanding of the nature of systemic
risk, industries that are small (in terms of number of participants or
volume of transactions) and fragmented, such as the Canadian hedge fund
industry, contribute relatively little to systemic risk. Further, Canadian
hedge funds tend to use leverage sparingly (most with gearing ratios of
less than 2:1), and some do not use leverage at all. 0 8 However, this does
not necessarily obviate the need for a domestic hedge fund reporting and
monitoring regime. If the Canadian hedge fund industry continues on its
current growth trajectory, then it may in the future contribute meaningfully
to systemic risk. Again, an important presumption of this paper is that a
systemic risk reporting and monitoring regime is desirable or beneficial
for the Canadian hedge fund industry.
The regulatory framework within which Canadian hedge funds
operate is familiar. In fact, it is the same regulatory framework with which
all other securities market participants must comply. Foremost, securities
regulation in Canada is a matter of provincial jurisdiction; however, for
practical purposes, most securities regulations are harmonized as CSA
National Instruments such that compliance is effectively consistent. 0 9
Broadly speaking, the regulations that apply to hedge funds may be
classified as either registration or disclosure requirements.
Of particular importance to Canadian hedge funds and those that
manage them are the registration regulations set out in National Instrument
31-103 Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant
Obligations."o Condon, Anand and Sarra explain the significance of that
National Instrument:
In fall 2009, a major harmonization effort was accomplished in the
registration area with the introduction of NI 31-103, Registration
Requirements and Exemptions, which recast [the] categories of
registration, streamlined substantive registration requirements, and
clarified the role of self-regulatory organizations in this area."'
108. Peter Loach & Peter Shippen, "An Introduction to Hedge Funds" (MarCh 2003) at iv, online:
BMO Nesbitt Burns <nesbittbums.bmo.com/pictures/account-don.mcgugan@nbpcd.com/hedge%20
funds.pdf>.
109. Darin R Renton, "Securities Registration and Compliance" in AlMA Canada, Handbook, supra
note 99, 28 at 28.
110. RegistrationRequirements, Exemptions and Ongoing RegistrantObligations,OSC, NI 31-103,
(2013) OSCB 5723 (6 June 2013) [NI 31-103].
111. Mary G Condon, Anita I Anand & Janis P Sarra, Securities Lav in Canada: Cases and
Commentary, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 3.
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According to NI 31-103, those in the "business" of trading, such as hedge
fund managers, must register as Dealers (section 7.1 (1)), Advisers (section
7.2(1)), or Investment Fund Managers (section 7.3).112 Hedge fund
managers typically avoid Dealer status by registering as Exempt Market
Dealers pursuant to section 7.1 (1)(d) of NI 31-103, but are subject to the
Advisor and Investment Fund Managers requirements. 113
As regards disclosure regulation, most hedge funds avoid the detailed
prospectus requirements by relying on exemptions set out in NI 31-103 and
4
National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions."
In particular, funds can avoid issuing a prospectus under NI 45-106 by
offering only to "accredited investors," which includes Schedule III banks
(s. 1.1 (a)), individuals with greater than $1 million financial assets (section
1.1(j)), or individuals with gross annual income greater than $200,000
(section 1.1 (k)). Condon, Anand and Sarra explain the rationale for such a
disclosure exemption:
The policy rationale for waiving prospectus requirements where the
purchaser of securities meets a certain threshold of wealth or investment
sophistication is.. .that financings can thereby be conducted on more
efficient terms without unduly compromising investor protection."5
To be sure, that hedge funds and those that manage them rely on statutory
exemptions to avoid certain registration or disclosure requirements is not a
fault of the regulatory system. These exclusions are deliberate and intended
to enhance market efficiency while maintaining investor protection. As
such, this description is not intended to suggest that the exemptions used
by Canadian hedge funds, or those in other jurisdictions for that matter, are
unnecessary or ill conceived.
In addition to NI 31-103 and NI 45-106, domestic hedge funds and
those that manage them must be aware of certain additional rules set out in
Ontario's Securities Act and Regulations. 116 This legislation is significant
because many Canadian funds are domiciled in that province." 7 However,
for the purpose of this analysis, the regulations and exemptions set out
in the National Instruments are an ample demonstration of the Canadian
hedge fund framework.
112. NI 31-103, supranote 110, s7.
113. Renton, supranote 109 at 29.
114. Prospectusand RegistrationExemptions, OSC,NI 45-106, (2013) 36 OSCB 2619 (14 March
2013) [Ni 45-106].
115. Condon, Anand & Sarra, supra note 111 at 326.
116. SecuritiesAct, RSO 1990, c S.5.
117. Cathy Singer, Barry Segal & Michael Bunn, "Foreign Investors in Canadian Hedge Funds" in
ALIMA Canada, Handbook, supranote 98, 58 at 58.

198

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Clearly, the Canadian hedge fund regulatory framework is extensive.
Indeed, some industry commentators have described it as being "[s]ome of
the world's most comprehensive regulation."" 8 And yet there is no system
in place for reporting and monitoring the systemic risk contributed to by
the Canadian hedge fund industry.
IV.Proposed Canadiansystemic risk reportingregime
Having described the hedge fund industries and corresponding regulations
in the U.S., Europe and Canada, and having identified the features of Form
PF and AIFMID, it is now possible to answer the question posed at the
outset. Again, that question is which features of Form PF and AIFMD are
appropriate for the Canadian regulatory context? To answer that question,
each of the five discrete features identified in the discussion above will be
qualitatively assessed using one or both of the criteria described below.
The result will be a set of features appropriate for a Canadian systemic
risk reporting regime.
This section discusses the two qualitative criteria used to assess the
Form PF and AIFMD features, which of those features are appropriate in
the Canadian regulatory context, and which regulatory body would likely
implement and operate a Canadian systemic risk reporting regime.
1. A tale of two criteria
"Mo' Money, Mo' Problems"
-Christopher Wallace, The Notorious B.I.G.
The two criteria by which the features of Form PF and AIFMD are to be
assessed are average industry fund size and cost of compliance. These
two criteria were selected to assess the features of Form PF and AIFMD
because they are mostly independent of the unique regulatory frameworks.
Each criterion will be described separately.
The average industry fund size criterion is simply a rough-order-ofmagnitude characterization of the composition of fund sizes that make
up the particular hedge fund industry. The rationale being that reporting
features designed to capture data from large funds may not be appropriate
for industries with small funds, and vice versa. In doing so, it is not
necessary to calculate a precise AUM or to define precise classification
thresholds; for this qualitative analysis, simply characterizing the funds
of an industry as small, medium, large and very large will suffice. For

118. Alternative Investment Management Association, "Alpha: Canada's Other Natural Resource"
(Toronto: AIMA Canada, October 2007) at 7, online: AIMA Canada <www.aima.org/filemanager/
root/siteassets/canada/publications/alphacanada s_resource -_oct_2007.pdtf>.
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example, it is sufficient to say that Canadian hedge funds are, on average,
small, and that U.S. funds are, on average, medium to very large.
The cost of compliance criterion is based on recent industry research
conducted by KPMG International. In 2013, KPMG International, the
Alternative Investment Management Association, and the Managed
Funds Association released a comprehensive study of the global impact
of regulatory compliance on hedge funds.' 9 That study, entitled "The Cost
of Compliance: 2013 KPMG/AIMA/MFA Global Hedge Fund Survey," is
intended to "provide.. .managers and regulators with valuable data to help
inform and drive their decision making processes and add... to the existing
body of knowledge on the cost of regulatory compliance for the hedge
fund sector."'' 21 In doing so, the researchers surveyed and interviewed 200
fund managers worldwide with a combined AUM of USD 910 billion.
Several finding of the KPMG research are particularly important to this
analysis.
Foremost, the cost of regulatory compliance is substantial. According
to "The Cost of Compliance," "the [hedge fund] industry is investing
heavily in compliance on average spending more than 7 percent of their total
operating costs on compliance technology, headcount or strategy.' 21 This
amounts to more than USD 3 billion globally.122 Perhaps not surprisingly,
the burden of all this compliance activity is disproportionately high for
smaller hedge funds.
The relative cost of complying with the reporting regimes is greater
for small funds than for larger funds. For small funds (those with less
than USD I billion AUM), the average amount spent on compliance is
USD 700,000. For medium and large funds (those with between USD
I and 5 billion AUM and those with greater than USD 5 billion AUM
respectively) the average amounts increase to USD 6 million and 14
million respectively. 23 Expressed as a percentage of aggregated AUM,
those figures amount to 0.24 per cent for small funds, 0.23 per cent for
medium funds, and 0.09 per cent for large funds. 24 In fact, small funds
in the U.S. tend to spend upwards of 0.4 per cent of aggregated AUM on
compliance. As far as reporting, regimes such as Form PF and AIFMD are
concerned, mo' money does not necessarily mean mo' problems.

119. KPMG, AIMA & MFA, "The Cost of Compliance," supra note 36.

120. Ibid at Foreword.
121.

bidat 4.

122. Ibid.
123. Ibid at 15.
124. Ibid.
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Based on the foregoing figures, it is clear that "[s]maller hedge funds
seem to be spending more, both as a percentage of AUM and relative to
operating costs, than their larger counterparts suggesting that some of the
smaller funds may struggle in the face of increased regulatory scrutiny."12.

The industry researchers reported on a further related figure that is of
particular importance to this analysis:
Significantly, smaller hedge funds seem to be spending more on regulatory
compliance costs on a relative basis than their larger counterparts. More
-than a third (35 percent) of hedge funds with less than USD250 million
in AUM said compliance requirements26represented more than 10 percent
or more of their total operating costs.

Given that most Canadian hedge funds are smaller than USD 250 million,
a Canadian reporting regime would likely impose a similar burden.
The researchers also explored the differences, both in terms of time
and costs, between compliance with Form PF and AIFMD. They found
that the cost of complying with AIFMD is greater than that of Form PF.
According to the researchers: "[i]n particular, respondents noted the high
costs of AIFMD authorization and reporting ....
SEC registration and
reporting was identified as the second most costly regulatory requirement
to comply with."'' 2 7 To put this in perspective, survey respondents ranked
both Form PF and AIFMD compliance as being more demanding that
FATCA compliance. 2 8 According to "The Cost of Compliance," AIFMD is
a particularly costly reporting regime because of the complexity associated
with incorporating many regulatory jurisdictions.
2. Assessing the features of Form PFand AIFMD
"We [conclude] that our regime contains an appropriate securities
regulatory framework for hedge funds, but that certain areas within it
could be improved."
-- CSA Staff Notice 81-316 29
The Canadian hedge fund industry is unlike the U.S. and European
industries in many ways. Perhaps most evident is the relatively small size
of the Canadian industry; again, it accounts for a little more than one per
cent of global hedge fund investment, and Canadian funds typically have
between CAD 50 and 100 million AUM. The size difference alone makes
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Ibid at 5.
Ibid at6.
Ibidat 10.
Ibid at11.
CSA Staff Notice 81-316, Hedge Funds,supranote 11 at277.

Keeping up with the Joneses: A Model Systemic Risk
Reporting Regime for the Canadian Hedge Fund Industry

201

it difficult to select the appropriate features of Form PF and AIFMD for
the Canadian industry.
Between the Form PF and AJFMD reporting regimes, there are
five possible features for a Canadian systemic risk reporting regime:
(a) a minimum size exemption, (b) progressive reporting frequencies,
(c) progressive depth of reporting, (d) uniform depth of reporting, and
(e) extensive data sharing. The appropriateness of these features will be
assessed separately.
a.. Minimum size exemption
Both the average industry fund size and cost of compliance criteria support
a minimum size exemption for a Canadian systemic risk reporting regime.
First, despite the Canadian industry comprising relatively small funds,
there is a subset therein that is small enough not to contribute to systemic
risk. As is the case with Form PF and AIFMID, it does not make sense to
include those inconsequential funds in a systemic risk reporting regime.
Second, from a cost perspective, requiring the smallest funds to report a
comprehensive data set would be disproportionately burdensome. In fact,
some suggest that doing so would act as a barrier to entry for new' small
funds. 3' Therefore, a minimum size exemption should be included in a
Canadian systemic risk reporting regime. But what AUM threshold should
be adopted and how should that threshold be calculated?
The depth of this analysis does not permit a specific size exemption to be
suggested. To do so would be purely speculative. However, any minimum
size exemption for the Canadian hedge fund industry would surely be less
than those of Form PF or AIFMD (USD 150 million and E100 million
respectively). A more comprehensive assessment of Canadian hedge fund
risk profiles and their counterparty relationships must be completed prior
to determining a specific minimum size exemption.
A minimum size exemption should be calculated similarly to the Form
PF exemption. That is, it should be based on fund RAUM, which is the
gross assets of all securities in the fund portfolio before subtracting any
leverage or liability. Again, this calculation provides a more consistent
and meaningful measure of fund size than does straight AUM, which may
distort the impact of the fund assets.
b. Progressivereportingfrequency
The average industry fund size and cost of compliance criteria do not
support a reporting regime that includes progressive reporting frequency.
First, the Canadian industry is populated by small funds; most Canadian
130. Ibid.
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funds have AUM between CAD 50 and 100 million, and few are larger
than that. By contrast, in the U.S., 66 per cent of funds have between USD
150 million and 1.5 billion RAUM, and 34 per cent of funds have greater
than USD 1.5 billion AUM. 13 1 It is this subset of very large funds in the
U.S. industry that justifies the progressive reporting frequency; the same
subset does not exist in the Canadian industry. Without a subset of large
and very large funds that contribute more to systemic risk, it is difficult
to justify progressive reporting frequency for the Canadian hedge fund
industry.
Second, the cost of reporting more than annually would be restrictively
burdensome for most Canadian funds. As described in "The Cost of
Compliance," the burden on small funds to comply with Form PF and
AIFMD is substantial. Therefore, to suggest that small Canadian funds
could report more than annually is not realistic.
c. Progressivedepth of reporting
The average industry fund size criterion does not support a reporting regime
that includes progressive depth of reporting. Here again, the Canadian
industry is populated by mostly small funds. The U.S. reporting regime
that supports this feature has many very large funds that can and should
provide fuller data to the SEC. Some 34 per cent of funds in the U.S.
industry have greater than USD 1.5 billion AUM; those funds cause and
contribute to systemic risk more readily than do small- and medium-sized
funds. 132 Without a subset of large and very large funds that contribute
more to systemic risk it is difficult to justify progressive reporting depth
for the Canadian hedge fund industry.
d. Uniform depth of reporting
The average industry fund size criterion supports a reporting regime
that collects uniform data from all qualifying hedge funds. The AIFMD
regime requires all funds to report the same 130 data points; these data
are intended to capture data from funds of all sizes. Indeed, a fund with
little more than the minimum size exemption must report the same data
as a very large European fund. A Canadian risk reporting regime should
be tailored to the average industry fund size: small funds. An appropriate
basis for the Canadian approach is the general data gathered from small and
medium funds by Form PF, including: types of funds advised or managed;
fund metrics such as size, leverage, liquidity, and performance; types
of investors; fund strategy; counterparty credit risk; and, use of trading
131. SEC, Annual Staff Report re Use of Data,supra note 57 at 5.
132. Ibid.
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and clearing mechanisms. These general data would allow a Canadian
regulator to assess the likelihood that investors will withdraw their funds
in a given period, and the impact of fund failure on counterparties.
e. Extensive data sharing
The two criteria are not necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of sharing
systemic risk data; the appropriateness of this feature makes logical sense.
A Canadian regulator charged with collecting data on systemic risk should
share that information with any and all like-minded regulators. Doing so
will give regulators a better understanding of the industry and enhance
the regulatory goal of promoting financial stability. As with the Form PF
data collected by the SEC, a Canadian regulator should also share nonproprietary data with international regulators, including IOSCO, so as to
build a more complete picture of global systemic risk.
Based on the foregoing discussion, three Form PF and AIFMD features
are appropriate in the Canadian regulatory context: (a) a minimum size
exemption, (b) uniform depth of reporting, and (c) extensive data sharing.
These three features are appropriate in the Canadian regulatory context
because they are sensitive to the relatively small size of Canadian funds.
They would also curtail the cost of complying with a new reporting
scheme, a strain that is disproportionately burdensome for small funds.
3.

Whose line is it anyway?
"By analogy with Statistics Canada, it might be argued that broad
national data-collecting powers may serve the national interest in a way
that finds no counterpart on the provincial plane."
-Supreme

Court of Canada, Reference re SecuritiesAct

33

In 2011, the Governor in Council submitted a reference to the Supreme
Court of Canada concerning the constitutional validity of a draft federal
Securities Act. That draft legislation was an attempt by the federal
government to consolidate provincial securities legislation into a single,
national Act. In light of the constitutionally defined division of legislative
power, the federal government asserted that "the securities market
has evolved from a provincial matter to a national matter affecting the
country as a whole and that, as a consequence, the federal general trade
and commerce power gives Parliament legislative authority over all
aspects of securities regulation." '34 The draft Securities Act suggested a
single regulatory scheme to govern all aspects of the. Canadian securities
133. Reference re SecuritiesAct, 2011 SCC 66 at para 105, [2011] 3 SCR 837.
134. Ibid at para4.
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market(s); to implement this would supplant or marginalize the existing
provincial regulatory power.
The Court responded to the reference question in the negative; as
drafted, the national SecuritiesAct was mostly unconstitutional. In reaching
this decision, the Court acknowledged that systemic risk permeates
provincial boundaries. According to the Court, the risk characteristics of
investors in one provincial market can directly impact the characteristics
of those in another. This recognition is important because it recognizes the
possibility of a nationwide risk control and data collection mechanism.
Indeed, the Court suggested just that at paragraphs 117 and 130:
Aspects of the Act, for example those aimed at management of systemic
risk and at national data collection, appear to be directly related to the
larger national goals which the Act proclaims are its raison d'etre.35
[A] cooperative approach that permits a scheme that recognizes the
essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing
36
Parliament to deal with genuinely national concerns remains available.
Given that monitoring systemic risk falls within the federal constitutional
jurisdiction, a national regulator would likely implement and operate any
Canadian systemic risk reporting regime.
Unilateral implementation of any such a regime is unlikely; as the Court
wrote at paragraph 130 above, cooperation is the preferred mechanism for
any systemic risk reporting and monitoring regime. Laskin and Patterson
explain:
It is well established that both Parliament and provincial legislatures may
delegate powers to agencies established by the other .... [11n the securities
regulation context, the preferred delegation (assuming the objective is a
single, national regulator) would be delegation "up" from the provinces
to a federal agency.' 37
Based on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Reference re Securities
Act, a national regulator should implement and operate a systemic risk
reporting mechanism. However, such a regime would and should include
the cooperation and inputs of provincial securities regulators. Indeed, their
closeness to the Canadian hedge fund industry makes them ideally suited
to the task of collecting systemic risk data through existing disclosure
135. Ibid at Para 117.
136. Ibid at para 130.
137. John B Laskin & Darryl C Patterson, "Moving Forward after the SecuritiesAct Reference: The
Future of Securities Regulation in Canada" (2012) 1:1 Commercial Litigation & Arbitration Rev 5 at
9-10.
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channels. Such an approach would, according to the Court, respect the
"growing practice of resolving the complex governance problems that
arise in federations.. .by seeking cooperative solutions that meet the needs
of the country as a whole as well as its constituent parts.' 38
Conclusion
Monitoring and reducing systemic risk is a priority for financial regulators
worldwide. Since the global financial crisis, securities regulators in the
U.S. and Europe have taken steps to monitor the systemic risk caused or
contributed to by the hedge fund industry. That industry in particular was
singled out for more stringent regulation because of its interconnectedness
and tendency to magnify existing systemic risk. The mechanisms adopted
to collect hedge fund risk information in the U.S. and Europe are labeled
Form PF and AIFMD respectively. Despite the risks posed by hedge funds,
Canadian securities regulators have not taken similar steps to monitor the
domestic industry.
This paper suggests a model, based on Form PF and AIFMD, by which
Canadian securities regulators may monitor the systemic risk contributed
to by the domestic hedge fund industry. In doing so, two qualitative
criteria were used to identify the features of Form PF and AIFMD that
are appropriate in the Canadian regulatory context: average industry fund
size and cost of compliance. These criteria account for the relative size
difference between the U.S. and European industries, and the Canadian
industry.
Three features of Form PF and AIFMD were identified as being
appropriate in the Canadian regulatory context: (a) a minimum size
exemption, (b) uniform depth of reporting, and (c) extensive data sharing.
First, a minimum size exemption recognizes that the smallest funds in
the Canadian industry do not contribute appreciably to systemic risk;
they should not be burdened with costly reporting. Second, uniform
reporting recognizes that the average Canadian fund size is small. A tiered
or progressive approach, like that of Form PF, is not justifiable where
the industry does not contain many large- and very large-sized funds.
Third, data sharing is desirable because it enhances the regulatory goal of
promoting financial stability.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in Reference re
Securities Act that a national regulator should implement and operate any
Canadian systemic risk reporting regime. However, the Court also opined

138. Reference re SecuritiesAct, supra note 133 at para 132.
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that the preferred mechanism for any such regime would be cooperative
and include the input of provincial regulators.
There can be little doubt that implementing a systemic risk reporting
regime for the Canadian hedge fund industry would be a contentious
undertaking. Such is the nature of financial regulation. In pursuing such a
regime, Canadian securities regulators would surely encounter the delicate
balance between protecting vulnerable investors, promoting innovation,
and facilitating market efficiency. And as if that balance is not difficult
enough, add yet another factor: keeping pace with regulatory initiatives in
other jurisdictions-or, less formally, keeping up with the Joneses.

